Proof obligation discharge using the PF transform

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Summary


Learning outcomes:

- Discharging proof obligations via PF-transform. Pre/post conditions. Invariants.
- Extended static checking in the PF-style. PF-calculation of weakest pre-conditions for invariant maintenance.

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Three examples

Broad picture: a "all-in-one" strategy for PO discharge



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Poof obligations in the PF-style

In general:

Input/output property preservation (functions) *Proof obligation*

$$\langle \forall x : p x : q (f x) \rangle \tag{1}$$

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stating that function f ensures property q on its output every time property p holds on its input PF-transforms to

$$f \cdot \Phi_p \subseteq \Phi_q \cdot f \quad cf. \ diagram \qquad A \xleftarrow{\Phi_p} A \qquad (2)$$

$$f \downarrow \qquad \qquad \downarrow f \\ B \xleftarrow{\Phi_q} B$$

Predicates as "types"

We will write "type declaration"

$$\Phi_q \xleftarrow{f} \Phi_p \tag{3}$$

to mean (2).

Exercise 1: Show that (2) and

$$f \cdot \Phi_p \subseteq \Phi_q \cdot \top \tag{4}$$

are the same.

 \square

Exercise 2: Prove the equivalence

$$\Phi_q \xleftarrow{id} \Phi_p \equiv q \Leftarrow p \tag{5}$$

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Exercises

Exercise 3: Infer from (3) and properties (59) to (61) the following ESC (*extended static checking*) properties:

$$\Phi_q \xleftarrow{f} \Phi_{\rho_1} \cup \Phi_{\rho_2} \equiv \Phi_q \xleftarrow{f} \Phi_{\rho_1} \land \Phi_q \xleftarrow{f} \Phi_{\rho_2}$$
(6)

$$\Phi_{q_1} \cdot \Phi_{q_2} \xleftarrow{f} \Phi_{\rho} \equiv \Phi_{q_1} \xleftarrow{f} \Phi_{\rho} \wedge \Phi_{q_2} \xleftarrow{f} \Phi_{\rho}$$
(7)

Exercise 4: Using (4) and the relational version of McCarthy's conditional combinator which follows,

$$c \to f, g = f \cdot \Phi_c \cup g \cdot \Phi_{\neg c}$$
 (8)

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infer the conditional ESC rule which follows:

$$\Phi_q \stackrel{c \to f,g}{\longleftarrow} \Phi_p \equiv \Phi_q \stackrel{f}{\longleftarrow} \Phi_p \cdot \Phi_c \wedge \Phi_q \stackrel{g}{\longleftarrow} \Phi_p \cdot \Phi_{\neg c} \quad (9)$$

Relationship with Hoare Logic

Let us show that Hoare triples such as

$$\{p\}P\{q\} \tag{10}$$

are also instances of ESC proof obligations. First we spell out the meaning of (10):

$$\langle \forall s : p s : \langle \forall s' : s \xrightarrow{P} s' : q s' \rangle \rangle$$
 (11)

Then (recording the meaning of program P as relation $[\![P]\!]$ on program states) we PF-transform (11) into

$$\Phi_p \subseteq \llbracket P \rrbracket \setminus (\Phi_q \cdot \top) \tag{12}$$

thanks to the introduction of relational (left) division,

$$b(R \setminus S) a \equiv \langle \forall c : c R b : c S a \rangle$$
(13)

Relationship with Hoare Logic

Thanks to "al-djabr" rule

$$R \cdot X \subseteq S \equiv X \subseteq R \setminus S$$
(14)

we obtain

 $\llbracket P \rrbracket \cdot \Phi_p \subseteq \Phi_q \cdot \top \tag{15}$

equivalent to

 $\llbracket P \rrbracket \cdot \Phi_p \subseteq \Phi_q \cdot \llbracket P \rrbracket$

which shares the same scheme as

 $f \cdot \Phi_p \subseteq \Phi_q \cdot f$

earlier on.

Summary

In general, we will write "type declaration"

$$\Psi \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \tag{16}$$

to mean

$$R \cdot \Phi \subseteq \Psi \cdot R \tag{17}$$

In words:

- Notation (16) can be regarded as the type assertion that, if fed with values (or starting on states) "of type Φ" computation *R* yields results (moves to states) "of type Ψ" (if it terminates).
- So functional ESC POs and Hoare triples are one and the same device: a way to type computations, be them specified as (always terminating, deterministic) functions or encoded into (possibly non-terminating, non-deterministic) programs.

The invariant maintenance (IM) PO

Pointfree:

$$\Phi_{inv} \xleftarrow{R} \Phi_{inv} \tag{18}$$

that is,

 $R \cdot \Phi_{inv} \subseteq \Phi_{inv} \cdot R \tag{19}$

Pointwise (functions):

 $\langle \forall a : inv a : inv(f a) \rangle$ (20)

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Pointwise (relations):

 $\langle \forall a : inv a : \langle \forall a' : a' R a : inv a' \rangle \rangle$ (21)

Mid point: pre-conditioned functions

The most typical situation corresponds to R being a function restricted by some precondition:

- Let $R := f \cdot \Phi_{pre}$ in (18), where *pre* is a given precondition.
- Then (18) becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
\Phi_{inv} &\stackrel{f \cdot \Phi_{pre}}{\longleftarrow} \Phi_{inv} \\
&\equiv & \{ \text{ definition } \} \\
& f \cdot \Phi_{pre} \cdot \Phi_{inv} \subseteq \Phi_{inv} \cdot \top \\
&\equiv & \{ \text{ definition } \} \\
& \Phi_{inv} &\stackrel{f}{\longleftarrow} \Phi_{pre} \cdot \Phi_{inv} \\
&\equiv & \{ \text{ going pointwise } \} \\
& \langle \forall a :: pre a \land inv a \Rightarrow inv(f a) \rangle \end{aligned}$$
(22)

Calculating Preconditions for IM

- Very often *f* and *inv* are given and *pre* is the "unknown": the idea is to find *pre* which is "enough" for (22) to hold.
- In fact, wherever *f* does not ensure maintenance of invariant *inv*, there is always a **pre-condition** *pre* which enforces this at the cost of *partializing f*: in the limit, *pre* is the *everywhere false* predicate.
- As a rule, the average programmer will become aware of such a pre-condition at runtime, in the **testing** phase.

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• One can find it much earlier, at specification time, when trying to discharge the standard proof obligation (22).

PF-ESC instead of invent & verify

However,

- Bound to **invent** *pre*, we'll hope to have guessed the **weakest** such pre-condition. Otherwise, future use of *f* will be spuriously constrained.
- Can we be sure of having hit the weakest pre-condition?

Our approach (**PF-ESC**) will be as follows:

- We take the PF-transform of *inv(f a)* in (22) at data level
 — and attempt to rewrite it to a term involving *inv a* and
 possibly "something else": the **calculated** pre-condition.
- This will be the weakest provided the calculation stays within equivalence steps (as shown in the next slides).

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Weakest pre-conditions

• Let us strengthen (22) to equivalence

 $\langle \forall a :: (pre a) \land (inv a) \equiv inv(f a) \rangle$ (23)

which PF-transforms to equality

$$\Phi_{pre} \cdot \Phi_{inv} = \top \cdot \Phi_{inv} \cdot f \tag{24}$$

- Later on we will show that (24) ensures *pre* as the **weakest** (up to logical equivalence) pre-condition for *inv* to be preserved.
- Weakest = sufficient + necessary for inv(f a) to hold.

Case study 1: PF-ESC at work

We want to calculate the WP for

add x I \triangle x : I

to preserve the no duplicates invariant on finite lists.

First step: PF-transform X^{*} to N → X (simple relation telling which elements take which position in list). Then the no duplicates invariant on L is encoded as ker L ⊆ id (L is injective)

Finally, $add \times L$ PF-transforms to

$$\underline{x} \cdot \underline{1}^{\circ} \cup \underline{L} \cdot \underline{succ}^{\circ} \tag{25}$$

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cf. back to points: $\{1 \mapsto x\} \cup \{i + 1 \mapsto (L \ i) : i \leftarrow \delta L\}$.

Case study 1: PF-ESC at work

- Second step: we start from the right hand side *inv(add × L)* of (23) and re-write it by successive equivalence steps until we reach:
 - condition *inv 1* ...
 - ... "plus something else" the calculated weakest pre-condition.
- Since the PF-transformed proof has to do with injectivity of union of relations, the following fact

```
R \cup S is injective \equiv

R is injective \land S is injective \land R^{\circ} \cdot S \subseteq id (26)
```

(easy to prove) is likely to be of use.

Case study 1: PF-ESC at work

add $\times L$ has no duplicates

- \equiv { cf. (25) etc }
 - $\underline{x} \cdot \underline{1}^{\circ} \cup L \cdot \textit{succ}^{\circ}$ is injective
- \equiv { (26) }

 $\underline{x} \cdot \underline{1}^{\circ} \text{ is injective } \land L \cdot \textit{succ}^{\circ} \text{ is injective } \land (\underline{x} \cdot \underline{1}^{\circ})^{\circ} \cdot L \cdot \textit{succ}^{\circ} \subseteq \textit{id}$

 \equiv { definition of injective (twice) ; "al-djabr" (59) }

 $\underline{1} \cdot \underline{x}^{\circ} \cdot \underline{x} \cdot \underline{1}^{\circ} \subseteq \textit{id} \land \textit{succ} \cdot L^{\circ} \cdot L \cdot \textit{succ}^{\circ} \subseteq \textit{id} \land \underline{x}^{\circ} \cdot L \subseteq \underline{1}^{\circ} \cdot \textit{succ}$

 \equiv { "al-djabr" (59,60) as much as possible }

 $\underline{x}^{\circ} \cdot \underline{x} \subseteq \underline{1}^{\circ} \cdot \underline{1} \wedge L^{\circ} \cdot L \subseteq \textit{succ}^{\circ} \cdot \textit{succ} \wedge \underline{x}^{\circ} \cdot L \subseteq \underline{1}^{\circ} \cdot \textit{succ}$

 $\equiv \{ \text{ kernel of constant function is } \top; \text{ succ is an injection } \} \\ \text{True} \land L^{\circ} \cdot L \subseteq \text{id} \land \underline{x}^{\circ} \cdot L \subseteq \underline{1}^{\circ} \cdot \text{succ} \}$

Case study 1: summary

We have thus calculated:

add x L has no duplicates
$$\equiv \underbrace{L \text{ is injective}}_{\text{no duplicates in } L} \land \underbrace{\underline{x}^{\circ} \cdot L \subseteq \underline{1}^{\circ} \cdot succ}_{\text{WP}}$$

PW-expansion of the calculated WP:

$$\underline{x}^{\circ} \cdot L \subseteq \underline{1}^{\circ} \cdot succ$$

$$\equiv \{ \text{go pointwise: (48) twice } \}$$

$$\langle \forall n :: x \ L \ n \Rightarrow 1 = 1 + n \rangle$$

$$\equiv \{ L \text{ models list } l \}$$

$$\langle \forall n : n \in \text{inds } l : x = (l \ n) \Rightarrow 1 = 1 + n \rangle$$

$$\equiv \{ 1 = 1 + n \text{ always false } (n \in \mathbb{N}) \}$$

$$\langle \forall n : n \in \text{inds } l : (l \ n) \neq x \rangle$$

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Case study 2: PF-ESC at work

From the mobile phone directory problem we select maintenance of the no duplicates invariant by function

store $x \triangleq (take 10) \cdot (x:) \cdot filter(x \neq)$

Remarks:

- It's sufficient to show that (x :) · filter(x ≠) preserves injectivity, since take n L ⊆ L (∀n) and smaller than injective is injective
- Defined over PF-transformed lists, *filter* becomes

$$filter(x \neq) L \triangleq (\neg \rho \underline{x}) \cdot L$$
(27)

where the negated range operator $(\neg \rho)$ satisfies property

$$\Phi \subseteq \neg \rho R \equiv \Phi \cdot R \subseteq \bot$$
 (28)

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Case study 2: PF-ESC at work

 $x : (filter(x \neq)L)$ is injective

 $\equiv \{ case study 1, (27) \}$

 $(\neg \rho \underline{x}) \cdot L$ is injective $\land \underline{x}^{\circ} \cdot (\neg \rho \underline{x}) \cdot L \subseteq \underline{1}^{\circ} \cdot succ$

 $\Leftarrow \qquad \{ \text{ smaller than injective is injective } \}$

L is injective $\land \underline{x}^{\circ} \cdot (\neg \rho \underline{x}) \cdot L \subseteq \underline{1}^{\circ} \cdot succ$

 \equiv { converses }

L is injective $\land L^{\circ} \cdot (\neg \rho \underline{x}) \cdot \underline{x} \subseteq succ^{\circ} \cdot \underline{1}$

 $\equiv \{ (\neg \rho \underline{x}) \cdot \underline{x} = \bot \text{ by left-cancellation of (28) } \}$

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L is injective $\land L^{\circ} \cdot \bot \subseteq succ^{\circ} \cdot \underline{1}$

 \equiv { bottom is below anything }

L is injective \wedge TRUE

Case study 2: PF-ESC at work

Moral of this case study:

Although the implication in the second step of the reasoning could put weakness of calculated pre-condition at risk, we've calculated the weakest of all conditions anyway (TRUE).

Exercise 5: Show that (28) stems from "al-djabr" rule

 $\Phi \subseteq \neg \delta R \equiv R \subseteq \bot / \Phi \tag{29}$

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among others.

Exercise 6: Prove (26).

Case study 3: Verified File System

A real-life case study:

- VSR (Verified Software Repository) initiative
- VFS (Verified File System) on Flash Memory challenge put forward by Rajeev Joshi and Gerard Holzmann (NASA JPL)
 [2]

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- Two levels POSIX level and (NAND) flash level
- Working document: Intel [®] Flash File System Core Reference Guide (Oct. 2004) is POSIX aware.

Case study 3: Verified File System

Deep Space lost contact with Spirit on 21 Jan 2004, just 17 days after landing.

Initially thought to be due to thunderstorm over Australia.

Spirit transmited an empty message and missed another communication session.

After two days controllers were surprised to receive a relay of data from Spirit.

Spirit didn't perform any scientific activities for 10 days.

This was the most serius anomaly in four-year mission.

Fault caused by Spirit's FLASH memory subsystem

intel

VERIFYING INTEL'S FLASH FILE SYSTEM CORE Miguel Ferreira and Samuel Silva University of Minho (pg10961.pg11034)@aluros.uminho.pt



Why formal methods? Software bugs cost millions of dolars.

What we can do? Build abstract models (VDM). Gain confidence on models (Alloy). Proof correctness (HOL & PF-Transform).

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Case study 3: Verified File System

The problem (sample):

File System API Reference



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4.6 FS_DeleteFileDir

Deletes a single file/directory from the media

Syntax

FFS_Status	FS_DeleteFileDir (
mOS_c	nar *full_path,	
UINT8	static_info_type);

Parameters

Parameter Description		
*full_path	(IN) This is the full path of the filename for the file or directory to be deleted.	
static_info_type	e (IN) This tells whether this function is called to delete a file or a directory.	

Error Codes/Return Values

FFS_StatusSuccess	Success
FFS_StatusNotInitialized	Failure
FFS_StatusInvalidPath	Failure
FFS_StatusInvalidTarget	Failure
FFS_StatusFileStillOpen	Failure

Sample of model's data types (simplified):

System = {table : OpenFileDescriptorTable, tar : Tar} inv sys $\triangleq \langle \forall \text{ ofd } : \text{ ofd } \in \text{rng (table sys)} : \text{ path ofd } \in \text{ dom tar sys} \rangle$

where

OpenFileDescriptorTable = FileHandler -> OpenFileDescriptor

 $\begin{aligned} & \textit{Tar} = \textit{Path} \rightarrow \textit{File} \\ & \textit{inv} \ tar \triangleq \langle \forall \ p \ : \ p \in \textit{dom tar} : \ \textit{dirName}(p) \in \textit{dom tar} \land \\ & \textit{fileType}(\textit{attributes}(\textit{tar}(\textit{dirName p}))) = \textit{Directory} \\ \end{aligned}$

OpenFileDescriptor = {*path* : *Path*, ...}

(Sample) API function:

 $\begin{aligned} FS_DeleteFileDir : Path &\rightarrow System \rightarrow (System \times FFS_Status) \\ FS_DeleteFileDir \ p \ sys &\triangleq \\ if \ p \neq Root \land p \in dom \ (tar \ sys) \land pre-FS_DeleteFileDir_System \ p \ sys \\ then \ (FS_DeleteFileDir_System \ p \ sys, FFS_StatusSuccess) \\ else \ (sys, FS_DeleteFileDir_Exception \ p \ sys) \end{aligned}$

where

 $\begin{array}{c} FS_DeleteFileDir_System: Path \rightarrow System \rightarrow System \\ FS_DeleteFileDir_System p (h, t) \triangleq \\ (h, FS_DeleteFileDir_Tar \{p\} t) \\ \hline \forall \ buffer \\ buffer \in rng \ h: \\ path \ buffer \neq p \land pre-FS_DeleteFileDir_Tar \ p \ t \end{array} \right)$

Sample API function (continued):

 $\begin{aligned} FS_DeleteFileDir_Tar : \mathcal{P}Path \rightarrow Tar \rightarrow Tar \\ FS_DeleteFileDir_Tar \ s \ t \ \triangle \ tar \setminus s \\ pre \ \langle \forall \ p \ : \ p \in dom \ tar : \ dirName \ p \in s \Rightarrow p \in s \rangle; \end{aligned}$

where

 $dirName : Path \rightarrow Path$ $dirName p \triangleq if p = Root \lor len p = 1$ then Rootelse blast p

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and so on. (NB: *blast* selects all but the last element of a list.)

Invariant structural synthesis (coreflexives)

- Real-size problems show where complexity is, namely the intricate structure involving nested datatype invariants.
- Need to calculate the associated coreflexives.
- Denoting by A_p the fact that datatype A is constrained by invariant p, we will write €_{Ap} to denote the associated coreflexive, calculated by induction on the structure of types:

$$\boldsymbol{\in}_{\boldsymbol{X}} = \boldsymbol{id} \tag{30}$$

$$\in_{K_p} = \Phi_p \tag{31}$$

$$\in_{(A \times B)_p} = (\in_A \times \in_B) \cdot \Phi_p \tag{32}$$

$$\in_{(\mathsf{F} A)_p} = \mathsf{F}(\in_A) \cdot \Phi_p \tag{34}$$

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Invariant structural synthesis (coreflexives)

Example:

 \in_{System}

 $= \{ (32), \text{ for } ri (= "referential integrity") \text{ the top level inv.} \}$ $(\in_{OpenFileDescriptorTable} \times \in_{Tar}) \cdot \Phi_{ri}$ $= \{ OpenFileDescriptorTable \text{ has no invariant} \}$ $(id \times \in_{Tar}) \cdot \Phi_{ri}$ $= \{ (31) \text{ for } pc (= "prefix closed") \text{ denoting } Tar's \text{ invariant} \}$ $(id \times \Phi_{pc}) \cdot \Phi_{ri}$ (35)

Facing complexity

Need to "find structure" in the specification text:

FS_DeleteFileDir p has conditional "shape"

$$c \rightarrow \langle f \cdot \Phi_p, \underline{k} \rangle, \langle id, g \rangle$$
 (36)

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where

- c is the (main) if-then-else's condition
- f abbreviates FS_DeleteFileDir_System p
- *p* is the precondition of *f*
- k abbreviates FFS_StatusSuccess
- g abbreviates FS_DeleteFileDir_Exception p

What's the advantage of pattern (36)?

See the "divide and conquer" rules which follow:

Further to (5), (7), (9):

• Trivial:

 $id \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \phi \equiv \phi \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \bot \equiv \psi \stackrel{\perp}{\longleftarrow} \phi \equiv \text{True} (37)$

Trading:

$$\Upsilon \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \cdot \Psi \equiv \Upsilon \stackrel{R \cdot \Phi}{\longleftarrow} \Psi$$
(38)

• Composition (Fusion):

$$\Psi \stackrel{R \cdot S}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \quad \Leftarrow \quad \Psi \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Upsilon \land \Upsilon \stackrel{S}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \tag{39}$$

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Split by conjunction:

 $\Psi_1 \cdot \Psi_2 \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \equiv \Psi_1 \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \wedge \Psi_2 \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \quad (40)$

- generalizes (7)
- Weakening/strengthening:

$$\Psi \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \quad \Leftarrow \quad \Psi \supseteq \Theta \land \ \Theta \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Upsilon \ \land \Upsilon \supseteq \Phi \qquad (41)$$

Separation:

$$\Upsilon \cdot \Theta \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \cdot \Psi \quad \Leftarrow \quad \Upsilon \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \land \Theta \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Psi \quad (42)$$

outcome of (41), (40)

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• **Splitting** (functions):

$$\Psi \times \Upsilon \stackrel{\langle f,g \rangle}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \equiv \Psi \stackrel{f}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \land \Upsilon \stackrel{g}{\longleftarrow} \Phi$$
(43)

Splitting (in general):

 $\Psi \times \Upsilon \stackrel{\langle R, S \rangle}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \equiv \Psi \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \cdot \delta S \land \Upsilon \stackrel{S}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \cdot \delta R (44)$

Product:

$$\Phi' \times \Psi' \stackrel{R \times S}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \times \Psi \equiv \Phi' \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \wedge \Psi' \stackrel{S}{\longleftarrow} \Psi$$
(45)

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Conditional:

 $\Psi \stackrel{c \to R, S}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \equiv \Psi \stackrel{R}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \cdot \Phi_c \wedge \Psi \stackrel{S}{\longleftarrow} \Phi \cdot \Phi_{\neg c} \quad (46)$

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which generalizes (6).

NB:

Close relationship with Hoare logic axioms

- but note many equivalences instead of implications


Exercise 7: Use the PF-calculus to prove the correctness of the rules given above.

Checking FS_DeleteFileDir:

 $\in_{System \times FFS_Status} \xrightarrow{FS_DeleteFileDir p} \in_{System}$ \equiv { (36) } $\in_{Svstem} \times id \xleftarrow{c \to \langle f \cdot \Phi_{\rho}, \underline{k} \rangle, \langle id, g \rangle} \in_{Svstem}$ \equiv { conditional (46) } $\in_{\text{System}} \times id \stackrel{\langle f \cdot \Phi_{\rho}, \underline{k} \rangle}{\longleftarrow} \in_{\text{System}} \cdot \Phi_{c}$ \wedge $\in_{\text{System}} \times id \stackrel{\langle id,g \rangle}{\prec} \in_{\text{System}} \cdot \Phi_{\neg c}$

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 \equiv { splitting (44,43) }



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$$\begin{aligned} & \in_{System} \stackrel{f \cdot \Phi_{p}}{\longleftarrow} \in_{System} \cdot \Phi_{c} \\ & \equiv \qquad \{ \text{ trading (38), unfold } \in_{System} (35) \} \\ & (id \times \Phi_{pc}) \cdot \Phi_{ri} \stackrel{f \cdot \Phi_{p} \cdot \Phi_{c}}{\longleftarrow} (id \times \Phi_{pc}) \cdot \Phi_{ri} \\ & \leftarrow \qquad \{ \text{ separating (42)} \} \\ & \Phi_{ri} \stackrel{f \cdot \Phi_{p} \cdot \Phi_{c}}{\longleftarrow} \Phi_{ri} \land id \times \Phi_{pc} \stackrel{f \cdot \Phi_{p} \cdot \Phi_{c}}{\longleftarrow} id \times \Phi_{pc} \\ & \equiv \qquad \{ \text{ trading (38) and implication } c \Rightarrow p \} \\ & \Phi_{ri} \stackrel{f}{\longleftarrow} \Phi_{ri} \cdot \Phi_{c} \land \\ & id \times \Phi_{pc} \stackrel{f}{\longleftarrow} (id \times \Phi_{pc}) \cdot \Phi_{c} \end{aligned}$$

- So much for PO calculation "in-the-large".
- Going "in-the-small" means spelling out invariants, functions and pre-conditions and reason as in the previous case studies
- Let us pick the first PO, $\Phi_{ri} \leftarrow \Phi_{ri} \cdot \Phi_c$, for example.
- As earlier on, we go pointwise and try to rewrite ri(f(M, N))


 M keeps open file descriptors, N the file contents into
 ri(M, N) + a weakest precondition; then we compare the
 outcome with what the designer wrote (Φ_c).

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Clearly, from slide 25 we infer

 $ri(M, N) \triangleq \rho(path \cdot M) \subseteq \delta N$

cf. diagram



which is a referential integrity constraint relating paths in open-file descriptors and paths in the file store N. PF calculation will lead to

 $ri(M,N) \triangleq path \cdot M \subseteq N^{\circ} \cdot \top$ (47)

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thanks to (64) etc.

We calculate:

ri(f(M, N)) $= \{ (36) \}$ $ri(FS_DeleteFileDir_System p (M, N))$ $= \{ FS_DeleteFileDir_Tar \ s \ t \ \Delta \ tar \ s \ etc \ \}$ $ri(M, N \cdot \neg \rho p)$

We can generalize from single path p to a set S of paths:

 $ri(M, N \cdot \Phi_{\neg S})$ $\equiv \{ (47) \}$ $path \cdot M \subseteq (N \cdot \Phi_{\neg S})^{\circ} \cdot \top$ $\equiv \{ converses (50,51, 54) \}$

 $path \cdot M \subset \Phi_{\neg S} \cdot N^{\circ} \cdot \top$ { (66), coreflexives (55), $(\cdot \top)$ distribution } \equiv $path \cdot M \subset \Phi_{\neg S} \cdot \top \cap N^{\circ} \cdot \top$ \equiv { \cap -universal (52) } $path \cdot M \subset \Phi_{\neg S} \cdot \top \land path \cdot M \subset N^{\circ} \cdot \top$ \equiv { "al-djabr"; (47) } $M \subseteq path^{\circ} \cdot \Phi_{\neg S} \cdot \top \land ri(M, N)$ wp { going pointwise } \equiv $\langle \forall b : b \in rng \ M : path \ b \notin S \rangle \land ri(M, N)$

Summary

- Thus we've checked (part) of the pre-condition of *FS_DeleteFileDir_System*, recall slide 25
- The other checks are performed in a similar way.
- Two levels of PO calculation: **in-the-large** (PO level) and **in-the-small** (where PF-notation describes data).
- PO-level useful in preparing POs for a theorem prover, recall diagram of slide 3.

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"Napkin" rule:

$$b(f^{\circ} \cdot R \cdot g)a \equiv (f \ b)R(g \ a)$$
(48)

Converses:

$$(R \cup S)^{\circ} = R^{\circ} \cup S^{\circ}$$
(49)

$$(R \cdot S)^{\circ} = S^{\circ} \cdot R^{\circ}$$
(50)

$$(R^{\circ})^{\circ} = R$$
(51)

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Meet and join:

$$X \subseteq R \cap S \equiv X \subseteq R \land X \subseteq S$$
(52)
$$R \cup S \subseteq X \equiv R \subseteq X \land S \subseteq X$$
(53)

Coreflexives are symmetric and transitive:

$$\Phi^{\circ} = \Phi = \Phi \cdot \Phi \tag{54}$$

Meet of two coreflexives is composition:

$$\Phi \cap \Psi = \Phi \cdot \Psi \tag{55}$$

Equality on relations $B \stackrel{R,S}{\longleftarrow} A$:

$$R = S \equiv R \subseteq S \land S \subseteq R \tag{56}$$

Alternative to (56) — indirect equality rules:

$$R = S \equiv \langle \forall X :: (X \subseteq R \equiv X \subseteq S) \rangle$$

$$\equiv \langle \forall X :: (R \subseteq X \equiv S \subseteq X) \rangle$$
(57)
$$(58)$$

Shunting rules:

$f \cdot R \subseteq S$	≡	$R \subseteq f^{\circ} \cdot S$	(59)
$R \cdot f^{\circ} \subseteq S$	≡	$R \subseteq S \cdot f$	(60)

Therefore

$$f \cdot (R \cup S) = f \cdot R \cup f \cdot S \tag{61}$$

Kernel, image (the same for respectively δ, ρ):

$$\ker (R^{\circ}) = \operatorname{img} R$$
 (62)

$$\operatorname{img} (R^{\circ}) = \ker R$$
 (63)

Range:

$$\rho R \subseteq \Phi \equiv R \subseteq \Phi \cdot \top \tag{64}$$

Domain/range elimination:

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Weakest (liberal) pre-condition is the upper adjoint of the following "al-djabr" rule [1] which combines two already seen — range (64) and left division (13):

$$\rho(R \cdot \Phi) \subseteq \Psi \equiv \Phi \subseteq R \flat \Psi \tag{67}$$

The pointwise version wlp $R \psi$ of $R \downarrow \Psi$ is:

$$\mathsf{wlp} \ \mathsf{R} \ \psi \quad \triangleq \quad \langle \bigvee \ \phi \ :: \ \langle \forall \ b, a \ : \ b \ \mathsf{R} \ a : \ \phi \ a \Rightarrow \psi \ b \rangle \rangle$$

In the slide which follows we show that, if equivalence (23) holds then *pre* is the weakest precondition for *inv* to be maintained. The calculation proceeds by **indirect equality** (57) over coreflexive Φ :

Weakest pre-conditions

$$\Phi \subseteq \Phi_{pre} \cdot \Phi_{inv}$$

$$\equiv \{ \text{ rep. equal by equals (24) } \}$$

$$\Phi \subseteq \top \cdot \Phi_{inv} \cdot f$$

$$\equiv \{ \text{ "al-djabr" rule (59) ; converses } \}$$

$$f \cdot \Phi \subseteq \Phi_{inv} \cdot \top$$

$$\equiv \{ \text{ range (64) } \}$$

$$\rho(f \cdot \Phi) \subseteq \Phi_{inv}$$

$$\equiv \{ \text{ weakest pre-condition (67) } \}$$

$$\Phi \subseteq f \blacklozenge \Phi_{inv}$$

$$\therefore \{ \text{ indirection (57) } \}$$

$$\Phi_{pre} \cdot \Phi_{inv} = f \blacklozenge \Phi_{inv}$$



R.C. Backhouse.

Fixed point calculus, 2000.

Summer School and Workshop on Algebraic and Coalgebraic Methods in the Mathematics of Program Construction, Lincoln College, Oxford, UK 10th to 14th April 2000.

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